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HELPING YOURSELF WHILE SERVING TWO
MASTERS: DO SPECIALISTS VIOLATE RULE
10B-5 WHEN THEY INTERPOSITION?
Roman Asudulayev*
ABSTRACT
The decision of the Second Circuit in United States v. Finnerty
(Finnerty III) was the culmination of a number of District Court
decisions that found that specialists on the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) could not be held liable for fraud under Rule 10b-5 for
interpositioning, whereby they put themselves between buy and sell
limit orders, in violation of NYSE rules, and profited on the spread.
Finnerty III and its District Court sibling decisions were wrongly
decided. Specialists presented a uniquely thorny issue of agency law
to the Federal Courts in New York. This issue was under-analyzed by
the Federal Prosecutors and left the courts without a coherent theory
of fiduciary duty for specialists. This Note will demonstrate that there
is a fiduciary relationship between specialists and their public
customers and will untangle that relationship to show that it prohibits
interpositioning and that interpositioning was fraud under Rule 10b5.
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INTRODUCTION
With increasing public furor over the actions of various financial
institutions,1 it is easy to forget that apparent fraud in finance can
create tricky legal issues. In 2005, federal prosecutors charged fifteen
broker-dealers on the New York Stock Exchange, called
“specialists,”2 with fraudulent trading.3 The gist of the charge was
that the specialists took advantage of trade requests that clients had
sent to them.4 Although specialists are allowed to trade on their own
accounts, “when a buy order comes in at a higher price than a sell
order, the specialist’s duty is to match the customers rather than
profit from the spread.”5 The practice of profiting from the spread is
called “interpositioning.”6 Between 2005 and 2008, the Federal

1. See, e.g., Populism: Will There Be Blood?, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26, 2009,
available at 2009 WLNR 5800671.
2. For a full definition of a specialist see infra, Part I.A.
3. See The New York Stock Exchange: Specialists Stumble, ECONOMIST, Apr.
16, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 5924073.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. For a detailed discussion of interpositioning, see infra Part I.B and especially
infra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
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Prosecutor for the Southern District of New York began fifteen
prosecutions.7 All fifteen failed ignominiously8: seven were dropped
voluntarily; two ended in acquittal;9 two guilty pleas were set aside;
the government dropped a case against a fugitive;10 two had their
convictions overturned by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals;11 and
one individual, David Finnerty, had his conviction set aside by the
District Court, and the Second Circuit upheld the decision.12
Apparently, the government is quite unaccustomed to losing cases,13
fifteen especially. How did this fiasco occur?
This Note will shed light on the operation of the NYSE, discuss the
prosecutions, and explore the difficult legal questions they
presented—questions that arguably have been left unanswered. Part
I of this Note introduces the reader to the NYSE and its specialists,
explains interpositioning, discusses the background law that relates to
specialists—SEC Rule 10b-5,14 fraud, and fiduciary duty—and
explains some economic terminology that will later help put the role
of specialists and interpositioning into perspective, and to consider
this area of law from a more Legal Realist perspective.
Part II of this Note will discuss the logic used by the courts in their
ultimate rejection of the allegation of fraud against specialists for
interpositioning: the courts did not receive a strong argument that
specialists were fiduciaries of their clients, meaning that mere theft by
the specialists without any express promises to the contrary could not
be considered fraud. Part II will also discuss the arguments that
federal prosecutors put forth to show that the specialists were
7. The New York Stock Exchange: Specialists Stumble, supra note 3.
8. Dan Slater, More Specialists Prosecutions Sour, Southern District of NY 0-15,
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Aug. 26, 2008, 9:34 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
law/2008/08/26/more-specialist-prosecutions-sour-southern-district-of-ny-now-0-15/.
9. Chad Bray & Paul Davies, Moving the Market: NYSE Ex-Floor Trader’s

Conviction Thrown Out in Latest Blow to U.S.—District Judge Says Government
Failed to Prove Deception, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 2007, at C1.
10. Chad Bray, More Guilty Pleas Vacated in Probe of NYSE Trading, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 26, 2008, at C3.
11. United States v. Hayward, 284 F. App’x 857, 858 (2d Cir. 2008); Bray, supra
note 10, at C3.
12. United States v. Finnerty (Finnerty II), 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 547 (S.D.N.Y.
2007), aff’d, 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008); Bray, supra note 10, at C3.
13. Paul Davies, Specialists Mark Rare Setback for U.S. Attorney—Decision to

Drop Remaining Cases Against Elite NYSE Floor Traders Follows Series of
Miscalculations, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2006, at C1. A class action related to this
subject matter is still ongoing. See, e.g., In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 260 F.R.D.
55 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
14. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
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fiduciaries of their clients and that therefore their actions amounted
to fraud.
Part III of this Note explains that specialists play a negative role in
the economy when they interpose themselves as traders between their
customers, and therefore are an appropriate target for Rule 10b-5
fraud prosecution. Part III demonstrates how the arguments of the
prosecution were correct in their conclusion but not in their
reasoning, meaning that the courts were right to reject those
arguments. Part III concludes that specialists were agents of their
clients because they were their brokers, who are agents of their clients
to the extent of executing their clients’ trades. As agents, these
brokers had a fiduciary duty not to trade for their own benefit
without their clients’ knowledge, as both a formal matter and by
analogy to other legal doctrines.
I. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF INTERPOSITIONING AND SOME
ECONOMICS
This Part discusses the background concepts and law behind the
interpositioning prosecutions. It defines the term “specialist”15 and
the act of interpositioning.16 This Part also explains the relation of
fraud under Rule 10b-5 to breaches of fiduciary duty generally.17 It
then discusses two practices that are analogous to interpositioning:
trading ahead18 and insider trading.19 This Part also offers a discussion
of fiduciary duty, both in its inception20 and its operation.21 And,
finally, it explains some economic terminology that shall be useful to
understand the role that interpositioning plays in the financial
system.22

15. See infra Part I.A.
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. See infra Part I.C.
18. See infra Part I.D.1.
19. See infra Part I.D.2.
20. See infra Part I.E.1.
21. See infra Part I.E.2.
22. See infra Part I.F. For my analysis of interpositioning as an economic
phenomenon, see infra Part III.A.
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A. Specialists
Specialists have a long history whose beginnings are obscured by
legend.23 “In simplest terms,” George T. Simon and Kathryn M.
Trkla describe the specialist as “a member of an exchange that
specializes in trading a particular security or group of securities as
broker or as dealer.”24 Thus, when a member of the public wants to
buy a particular security at the NYSE, she must go through a
In other words,
specialist25 unless she trades electronically.
“[s]pecialists act as auctioneers in the specific stocks they are
designated to trade.”26 Thus, part of the specialist’s role is to match
up bids and offers,27 acting as a sort of “brokers’ broker,” taking
orders from public customers’ brokers to buy or sell securities.28
Generally, there are two kinds of orders that specialists take: market
orders, which are orders to buy or sell a security at the market price,
and limit orders, which are orders to buy or sell only if a certain price
is available.29 Generally, a bid limit order will ask that a security be
bought only when it is at or below a certain price, while an offer limit
23. J. Scott Colesanti, Not Dead Yet: How New York’s Finnerty Decision
Salvaged the Stock Exchange Specialist, 23 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1, 2–3
(2008). Note also that specialists are now called designated market makers, or
DMMs. See NYSE, NEXT GENERATION MODEL 1 (2008)¸ available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/Next_Generation_Model.pdf. However, this article will
refer to them as ‘specialists’ since that is the term used by the courts that dealt with
the issue. See, e.g., United States v. Finnerty (Finnerty III), 533 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir.
2008) (“Appellee David Finnerty was a specialist at the New York Stock Exchange . .
. .”).
24. George T. Simon & Kathryn M. Trkla, The Regulation of Specialists and
Implications for the Future, 61 BUS. LAW. 217, 222 (2005).
25. See NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, A GUIDE TO THE NYSE MARKET PLACE 7
(2d ed. 2006), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/nyse_bluebook.pdf (illustrating
how a member of the public sells a security and the role that the specialist plays in the
sale). Other stock exchanges have specialists, too. See Simon & Trkla, supra note 24,
at 222 (“The precise functions performed by specialists . . . vary based upon the
characteristics of the exchange market in which they operate.”). But because the
prosecutions of specialists all dealt with NYSE specialists, the NYSE is the focus of
this Note.
26. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 25, at 6.
27. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007). For the
remainder of this Note, the terms ‘bid’ and ‘offer’ will have specific meanings. A
‘bid’ will describe an offer to buy a security at a certain price; an ‘offer’ (except as
used within this definition) will describe an offer to sell a security at a certain price.
Thus a bid price is the price at which the bidder is willing to buy a security; the offer
price is the price at which the offeror is willing to sell that security.
28. Simon & Trkla, supra note 24, at 223.
29. 5 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §14.13[1], at 364
(6th ed. 2009).
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order will ask that a security be sold only when it is at or above a
certain price.30
Yet, specialists also have a second function: they can buy and sell
securities on their own accounts.31 Specifically, specialists may buy or
sell securities when there are no matching orders.32 In other words,
when there is a bid limit order that is too low for any existing offers,
the specialist may take the opposite side of the bid, and sell at the bid
price to prevent erratic market shifts.33 Another way to describe this
function is to say that specialists provide liquidity to the market, by
providing buyers or sellers for securities, when there would otherwise
be an imbalance.34 In this capacity, specialists act as “market
makers.”35 New York Stock Exchange Rule 104 prohibits specialists
from trading on their own account as market makers unless there are
no matchable customer orders.36 As a corollary, specialists are
supposed to match orders at either the bid or offer price.37

30. Id.
31. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 405 F. Supp. 2d 281, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2005),
rev’d on other grounds, 503 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007).
32. 5 HAZEN, supra note 29, at 342.
33. Id. at 342–43.
34. See In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007).
35. Specialists are not proper market makers because their primary function is not
to trade on their own account, but rather to broker trades between other traders. Cf.
5 HAZEN, supra note 29, at 310 (describing the role of market makers on “over the
counter” exchanges); infra note 126. Yet, specialists make a market insofar as they
still act as counter-parties to traders who cannot find a market for a security that
those traders would like to buy or sell. See 5 HAZEN, supra note 29, at 344 (noting
that one of the duties of a specialist is to “manage supply and demand imbalances”).
36. Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 533 F.3d 143 (2d
Cir. 2008); 5 HAZEN, supra note 29, at 344–45; NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE RULE
104T(a) (2013), available at http://nyserules.nyse.com/nysetools/PlatformViewer.asp
?SelectedNode=chp_1_2&manual=/nyse/rules/nyse-rules/ (“No DMM [specialist]
shall effect on the exchange purchases or sales of any security in which such DMM
[specialist] is registered . . . unless such dealings are reasonably necessary to permit
such DMM to maintain a fair and orderly market . . . .”); Bear Wagner Specialists,
L.L.C., New York Stock Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-51, ¶¶ 29–30 (Mar. 29,
2004), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/04-051.pdf; see also NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE RULE 476(a)(6) (2010), available at http://nyserules.nyse.com/
nysetools/PlatformViewer.asp?SelectedNode=chp_1_7&manual=/nyse/rules/nyserules/ (making “failing to observe high standards of commercial honor and just and
equitable principles of trade” a violation of the rules). Note that the current Rule
104T(a) was, at the time of the alleged violations, called Rule 104. See Bear Wagner,
New York Stock Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-51, ¶ 30; NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE RULE 104 (2003) (“No specialist shall effect on the Exchange purchases
or sales of any security in which such specialist is registered . . . unless such dealings
are reasonably necessary to permit such specialist to maintain a fair and orderly
market . . . .”). Exchanges, such as the NYSE, are to be regulated by the Securities
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Finally, specialists receive commissions for trades that they help
broker.38 Interestingly, this fact was subject to some controversy:
some of the courts specifically stated that specialists were not
compensated by their clients through commission.39 This may be
because the government appears to have conceded that specialists are
not compensated for these kinds of trades.40 Specialists are no longer
compensated through commissions for the trades that they broker;
rather, they are compensated through a profit-sharing system,
whereby the NYSE will pay them directly.41 What one must keep in
mind is that at the time of specialist prosecutions, specialists were
and Exchange Commission (SEC), under Section 11(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78K-1(b) (2012). The SEC produced Rule 11b-1,
which forced exchanges to make their own rules regarding specialists. 17 C.F.R. §
240.11b-1 (2012); see also Colesanti, supra note 23, at 13.
37. See, e.g., Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-49499, 82 SEC
Docket 1895, at *3 (Mar. 30, 2004) (discussing what a specialist should do when there
are two matchable orders with different prices).
38. 5 HAZEN, supra note 29, at 342 (explaining that when “[t]he specialist acts
solely as subagent, [she] receiv[es] a portion of the ‘book’ customer’s commission to
his broker”). At the time of Finnerty’s actions, 1999–2003, see Finnerty II, 474 F.
Supp. 2d at 532, the NYSE specialists received a commission, see Member-Firm Fee
Cap and Specialist Commissions on NYSE-Listed Equity Trading to Be Eliminated,
NYSE
EURONEXT
(Dec.
2006),
http://www.nyse.com/about/publication/
1165230695660.html (stating that in and before December 2006, specialists were
compensated by commission).
39. Compare 5 HAZEN, supra note 29, at 342 (discussing how specialists receive a
part of the public customer’s broker’s fee), and Colesanti, supra note 23, at 3 (noting
that specialists “shar[e] in the commission”), with Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 544
n.10 (citing United States v. Hunt, No. 05 CR. 395(DAB), 2006 WL 2613754, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006)) (agreeing that specialists are not compensated by their
public customers).
40. See, e.g., Indictment ¶ 4, United States v. Hunt, No. 05 CR. 395(DAB)
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006), 2005 WL 5973581. The confusion may stem from the fact
that individuals may not be compensated by brokerage commissions, but by a salary
and bonus, see Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 535 (discussing Finnerty’s
compensation), while the firms themselves are compensated with commissions, see
supra note 38.
41. Notice of Proposed Rule Change to Institute a Revised System of Payments
to Specialist Firms, 72 Fed. Reg. 51,287 (Sep. 6, 2007) (effecting new plan for
specialist compensation by profit sharing with the NYSE); Notice of Proposed Rule
Change to Prohibit Specialists from Charging Transaction Fees in their Specialists
Securities, 71 Fed. Reg. 71,217 (Dec. 8, 2006); NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE RULE
available
at
http://nyserules.nyse.com/NYSETools/Platform
104B
(2008),
Viewer.asp?searched=1&selectednode=chp_1_3_7_12&CiRestriction=104B&manual
=%2Fnyse%2Frules%2Fnyse-rules%2F; NYSE EURONEXT, supra note 38. The
NYSE changed this payment procedure in order to create a better incentivize
specialists to create liquidity in their respective markets for shares. See Notice of
Proposed Rule Change to Institute a Revised System of Payments to Specialist Firms,
72 Fed. Reg. at 51,287–88.
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compensated for the orders that they brokered between their public
customers.42
B.

Interpositioning

Interpositioning is occasioned by a pair of matchable limit orders
for some security, say a bid limit order at $100 and an offer limit
order at $99.90.43 The specialist “interposes” when she buys the
security from the offeror, at $100, and then sells to the bidder at
$99.90, pocketing ten cents on the trade.44 In this way, specialists can
take advantage of their function of receiving limit orders45 and their
ability to buy and sell on their own accounts46 by interposing
themselves between a lower offer price and higher bid offer and
trading on their own accounts, to buy from the offeror and then resell
to the bidder.47 These trades added up to a rather large amount: $158
million of lost client money, with one firm taking $38 million.48
Thus, in 2005, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New
York indicted fifteen individuals working for specialist firms for fraud
under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193449 and
Rule 10b-550 for interpositioning.51 These indictments followed on the

42. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
43. By definition, any order where the bid is higher than the offer is matchable
because whenever a buyer is willing to pay more than the seller wants, some bargain
is possible between the two parties. See also supra notes 25–26 and accompanying
text (explaining how specialists are made aware of bids and offers when they act as
brokers for brokers). On the other hand, if the bid is for a lower price than the offer,
there cannot be a trade. See 5 HAZEN, supra note 29, at 342–43 (showing how a bid
that is lower than the offer leads to inaction in the market, and may cause volatility
without the intervention of specialists). Orders that specify a price limit (bid or offer)
are limit orders. See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
44. Emil J. Bove III, Institutional Factors Bearing on Criminal Charging
Decisions in Complex Regulatory Environments, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1347, 1361
(2008) (giving an analogous example).
45. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
46. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-49499, 82 SEC
Docket 1895, at *1 (Mar. 30, 2004) (noting that one specialist firm made $38 million
through interpositioning between 1999 and 2003); Aaron Lucchetti & Kara Scannel,

Fifteen Indicted in NYSE Case—Elite Specialists Are Charged; Exchange Also
Settles Civil Charge and Will Videotape Its Traders, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2005, at C1
(specialists cost their clients $158 million).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
50. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). Rule 10b-5 specifies the conduct that violates
Section 10(b). Id. An intentional violation of Section 10(b), along with violations of
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heels of a settlement between the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the specialist firms, as well as another
settlement with the NYSE.52
The courts generally found that interpositioning did not violate
Rule 10b-5 because the government could not prove deception53 or
any untrue or misleading statements54—or statements made
misleading by an omission.55 The Second Circuit, reviewing the
District Court’s decision in Finnerty II, which set aside a guilty verdict
by the jury, stated that although specialists’ interpositioning may have
been conversion, it could not rise to the level of fraud, unless there
were an accompanying breach of fiduciary duty.56 The courts
generally found no fiduciary duty on the parts of the specialists.57
There were two explanations. First, the courts concluded that the
specialists were not paid by their customers, and therefore specialists
could not be the agents of their customers.58 Second, if specialists
were to be the agents of their customers, specialists would then have
two fiduciary relationships to two adversely positioned parties: a
buyer and a seller.59

most other section of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, carries with it criminal
sanctions, under Section 32(a) of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2006).
51. See United States v. Finnerty (Finnerty I), Nos. 05 Cr. 393 DC, 05Cr. 391 DC,
2006 WL 2802042, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2006); United States v. Hunt, No. 05 CR.
395(DAB), 2006 WL 2613754, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006); United States v.
Bongiorno, No. 05 CR. 390(HHS), 2006 WL 1140864, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2006);
Lucchetti & Scannell, supra note 48, at C1.
52. Lucchetti & Scannell, supra note 48, at C1.
53. See, e.g., Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 539–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 533
F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008) (discussing how violations of Subsections (a) and (c) of Rule
10b-5 need a showing of customer expectations). The court was initially open to the
possibility that the government could show that specialists deceived investors. See,
e.g., Finnerty I, 2006 WL 2802042, at *4–5. The court eventually decided that this
required a showing of specific representations by the defendant or some showing of
general customer expectations, which the government failed to produce. Finnerty II,
474 F. Supp. 2d at 539–40.
54. See, e.g., Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *4.
55. See, e.g., Bongiorno, 2006 WL 1140864, at *7.
56. See Finnerty III, 533 F.3d 143, 148–49 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing In re Refco
Capital Mkts., Ltd., Brokerage Customer Sec. Litig., No. 06 Civ. 643(GEL), 2007 WL
2694469, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2007)).
57. See, e.g., Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *6.
58. See, e.g., Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 544 n.10 (citing Hunt, 2006 WL
2613754, at *6). For a discussion of the veracity of this claim see supra notes 39–40
and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 544 (citing Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at
*6). The specifics of the courts’ decisions will be discussed infra Part II.A.
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Yet, before the interpositioning cases went to trial, the SEC found
interpositioning to be a violation of Rule 10b-5.60 Moreover, it settled
with all the specialist firms that it accused of interpositioning.61 The
SEC also settled with the NYSE for the interpositioning claims62
because interpositioning is a violation of NYSE Rules63 and the
NYSE failed to monitor its specialists and prevent their

60. See, e.g., Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-49499, 82 SEC
Docket 1895, at *6 (Mar. 30, 2004). One might ask why it is that if the SEC found
deception in the actions of the specialists, it was not accorded Chevron deference in
interpreting its organizational statute, see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–45 (1984), which is the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 for the SEC, see Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78(d)
(2006). But, administrative agencies, such as the SEC, do not get Chevron deference
for interpretations of statutes that courts do not consider ambiguous. Nat’l Credit
Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 500 (1988). Thus, the
Supreme Court has always started its analysis of Rule 10b-5 deception and fraud by
referring to the text of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
interpreting the term ‘deception’ on its own. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 472–73 (1977) (“The rulemaking power granted to an administrative
agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make
law. Rather, it is ‘the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of
Congress as expressed by the statute.’ . . . [The scope of the Rule] cannot exceed the
power granted the Commission by Congress under s 10(b).” (alteration and omission
in original) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 213–14 (1976))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,
679 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that no
Chevron deference was given to the SEC’s interpretation of Section 10(b) or Rule
10b-5). The SEC’s power extends only towards filling in “gaps” in its statutes, see
Roth ex rel. Beacon Power Corp. v. Perseus, L.L.C., 522 F.3d 242, 248–49 (2d Cir.
2008), but there are no gaps in the term ‘deceptive device’ in Section 10(b) or any
delegation for the SEC to define that or any other term in Section 10(b), see 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). Similarly, the SEC would be hard-pressed to argue that it had
Auer deference, given to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations in any
way not “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with regulation,” Auer v. Robbins, 519
U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)), because Auer deference is only
applicable when the underlying regulation is well within the limits of Chevron
deference, cf. id. at 456 (“The [statute] grants the Secretary broad authority to
‘defin[e] and delimi[t]’ the scope of the exemption for executive, administrative, and
professional employees.” (alterations in original) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1)
(2006))). Thus, courts interpreting Rule 10b-5 are free to ignore the SEC’s own
views as to what constitutes deception and simply interpret ‘deception’ in Section
10(b). Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 472 (citing Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 197). For the
SEC’s view on interpositioning as fraud, see infra notes 222–225 and accompanying
text.
61. Lucchetti & Scannell, supra note 48, at C1.
62. Id.
63. See Bear Wagner, Inc., New York Stock Exchange Hearing Panel Decision
04-51, ¶¶ 29–30 (Mar. 29, 2004), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/04-051.pdf
(ruling that interpositioning is a violation of NYSE Rule 104).
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interpositioning.64 The NYSE itself also penalized specialist firms for
interpositioning.65
Finally, in a decision certifying a class action against the NYSE
specialists, In re NYSE Specialists Securities Litigation, the court
appears to have been open to the idea that the class would be able to
prove some manner of deception.66 If the class were able to prove
that it was deceived by the specialists, it would be able to make out a
case of fraud without proving fiduciary duty because, in short,
fiduciary duty is merely one route to showing fraud: if one has garden
variety deception, one need not show fiduciary duty.67
C.

Rule 10b-5 and Fraud

Rule 10b-5, which specifies the acts that make up a violation of
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,68 makes it
illegal to use the national stock exchanges for any of the following
three purposes, “in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security”: (a) commit fraud, (b) make untrue statements or omit to
make statements that would make other statements, already made,
misleading, or (c) engage in an “act, practice, or course of business
which operates as a fraud.”69 Fraud, itself, is misrepresentation or
deception; its elements are material misrepresentation, scienter,

64. Lucchetti & Scannell, supra note 48, at C1.
65. See Bear Wagner, New York Stock Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-51,
¶¶ 29–30.
66. 260 F.R.D. 55, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that the class may be able to prove
that specialist firms engaged in deceptive practices, within the context of showing
predominance, pursuant to a class action). This action has been settled with respect
to the NYSE, a party to the litigation. Stipulation of Partial Settlement at 1, In re
NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., No. 1:03-cv-08624-RWS (Apr. 4, 2010), available at
http://securities.stanford.edu/1029/NYSE03-01/2010414_r01s_03CV08264.pdf.
However, the class action against the specialist firms is still ongoing; as of March 28,
2011 the settlement agreement had not been finalized. See Memorandum from David
Rosenfeld on NYSE Specialists Distribution Funds (Mar. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/311445/311445-18.pdf.
67. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) (explaining that
fraud under Rule 10b-5 is only relevant as a showing of deception under Section
10(b)). For a discussion of fraud, see infra Part I.C. For a discussion of fiduciary
duty, see infra Part I.E. For the courts’ discussions of whether specialists might owe a
fiduciary duty, see infra Part II.A, and for my view of the matter see infra Parts III.B,
III.C, and III.D.
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
69. 17 C.F.R. § 210.10b-5 (2012).
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reliance, and causation.70 A fraud is when one party intentionally
deceives (scienter and material misrepresentation) another party into
making some action (reliance) that is damaging to the deceived party
(causation).71 Thus, a violation of Rule 10b-5 and Section 10(b)
requires the following elements: scienter, misrepresentation of a
material fact, reliance causation, and the purchase of a security,72
which are the requirements of fraud, along with the requirement that
there be a purchase or sale of a security.73
Breaching a fiduciary duty can but does not always lead to a
finding of fraud.74 It is important to understand that not all breaches
of fiduciary duty are fraud.75 Some fiduciary duties are based on the
duty of care; the breach of such duty is regrettable but not necessarily
deceptive.76 But a breach of the fiduciary duty to disclose information
can be deceptive and thereby fraud.77 This is because when there is
an affirmative duty to disclose information, a lack of disclosure
suggests that there is no information to disclose. Thus, when
something happens that a fiduciary was under duty to disclose, the
absence of disclosure is akin to stating that nothing has happened: this
is deception; and so it is also fraud.78 Statements are not necessary for
fraud: “conduct itself can be deceptive.”79

70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525–26, 529 (1977). Scienter is
knowledge that what one is representing as true is false, or uncertainty that what one
is representing as true is true. See id. § 526.
71. See id.
72. See Burke v. Jacoby, 981 F.2d 1372, 1378 (2d Cir. 1992).
73. The elements of fraud are coextensive with those of a Rule 10b-5 violation but
for the latter’s requirement that the misrepresentation be with regard to the sale or
purchase of a security. Compare id., with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 525–
26, 529 (1977) (stating and explaining the elements of fraud).
74. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977).
75. See id.
76. See id. at 470, 474 (rejecting the lower court’s determination that an action
that was made without a justifiable business purpose could be fraud even though
there was no deception or manipulation).
77. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (“[S]ilence in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities may operate as a fraud actionable
under § 10(b) . . . . [But such liability is premised upon] a duty to disclose arising
from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction.”).
78. See id.; United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1985) (“Fraud in the
common law sense of deceit is committed by deliberately misleading another by
words, by acts, or, in some instances—notably where there is a fiduciary relationship,
which creates a duty to disclose all material facts—by silence.” (citing W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 105–06 (5th ed.
1984))). One of the reasons that it seems hard to find a simple expression of the way
that fiduciary duty may lead to fraud is because, originally, fraud was an action in

ASUDULAYEV_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

5/27/2013 7:26 PM

WHEN SPECIALISTS INTERPOSITION

927

D. Some Possible Analogies to Interpositioning
Before moving on to when fiduciary duties are created80 and what
fiduciary duties entail,81 it is useful to set the stage by considering two
practices similar to interpositioning that are outlawed: trading ahead82
and insider trading.83

1.

Trading Ahead

Interpositioning appears to be very similar to a prohibited practice
called trading ahead. Trading ahead occurs when a broker buys a
security, while knowing that one of her customers will buy that
security later.84 Brokers are well positioned to do this because
brokers receive orders from their customers and thus know what their
customers will buy.85 In United States v. Dial, the Seventh Circuit
ruled that trading ahead is a fraud under the mail and wire fraud
statutes86 because it is a failure “to ‘level’ with one to whom one owes
fiduciary duties.”87 In that case, broker Donald Dial, the defendant,
solicited a large order for silver futures from his customers, but before
he put that order on the market he put in an order for himself (and
his brokerage house).88 Once Dial decided that the price was too
high, he sold his (and his brokerage house’s) silver future positions
first, before selling those of his customers, whom he had solicited to
sell the futures, as well.89 Thus, he first denied his customers a lower

law, see, e.g., Moseley v. All Things Possible, Inc., 694 S.E.2d 43, 45 (S.C. Ct. App.
2010), while breach of fiduciary duty was an action in equity, see, e.g., In re
Evangelist, 760 F.2d 27, 29 (1st Cir. 1985).
79. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158
(2008); see also Dial, 757 F.2d at 168 (“But if someone asks you to break a $10 bill,
and you give him two $1 bills instead of two $5’s because you know he cannot read
and won’t know the difference, that is fraud.”).
80. That is, when a fiduciary relationship is created. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006). This issue is discussed infra Part I.E.1.
81. The nature of fiduciary duties and the difference between the duty of ordinary
care and the duty of disclosure are discussed infra Part I.E.2.
82. Trading ahead is illegal under Dial, 757 F.3d, and it is discussed in the
following Section: I.D.1.
83. Insider trading has been illegal ever since SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). Insider trading is discussed infra Part I.D.2.
84. See Dial, 757 F.2d at 165–66.
85. See id.
86. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006); Dial, 757 F.2d at 168–69.
87. See Dial, 757 F.2d at 168.
88. See id. at 166–67.
89. See id.
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buying price and then a higher selling price, taking both for himself.90
The Seventh Circuit, in a lucid opinion by Judge Richard Posner,
explained that brokers owe a fiduciary duty to their customers to get
them the best possible price.91
Dial misled his customers when he solicited their orders but did not
get them the best possible price.92 He traded ahead of his customers,
putting his large personal order ahead of their orders.93 His large
order pushed up the price of silver for the customers, whose orders
were filled at the increased market price.94 The corollary of this was
that Dial’s earlier order benefitted from the price increase that was
brought about by the subsequent large customer order.95 Similarly,
when it was time to sell, Dial sold off his large order first, at a higher
price, and then executed his customer’s sell orders afterwards, at a
price that was deflated by Dial’s own large sell order.96 In this way,
Dial was able to buy at a relatively lower price and sell at a relatively
higher price, to his benefit and to his customers’ detriment.97 He thus
made a profit by misleading his customers, which was fraud.98
Although trading ahead has been likened to interpositioning,99 Dial
differs from the interpositioning prosecutions in that Dial solicited
orders,100 while interpositioning does not require any solicitation,
since limit orders come to specialists as a matter of course.101
Moreover, the Dial court found that brokers are fiduciaries of their
clients,102 while the interpositioning cases did not find that specialists

90. See id.
91. See id. at 168 (citing Marchese v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 734 F.2d 414,
418 (9th Cir. 1984)).
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id. (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 183,
194–95 (1963)).
99. See, e.g., Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-49499, 82 SEC
Docket 1895, at *4 (Mar. 30, 2004) (explaining that trading ahead is like
interpositioning, except that there is not necessarily a second trade); Colesanti, supra
note 23, at 22 (noting that interpositioning is related to trading ahead).
100. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
101. Specialists receive customer orders passively. See supra notes 25–28 and
accompanying text.
102. See Dial, 757 F.2d at 168.
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are fiduciaries of their customers,103 nor did those courts even agree
that brokers are fiduciaries of their customers.104

2.

Insider Trading

Another analogy to interpositioning is insider trading. Trading
ahead, somewhat similar to interpositioning,105 has been equated to
insider trading.106 Insider trading is trading on material non-public
information in breach of a fiduciary duty.107 The “classical theory” of
insider trading—so termed in United States v. O’Hagan108—was
premised on the fiduciary duty of loyalty that an employee of a
corporation owed to the shareholders of a corporation not to buy
stocks from those shareholders using information that the employee
should have disclosed to the shareholders.109
Another theory is the misappropriation theory, coined by the
government, in O’Hagan.110 Insider trading can also be fraud when it
breaches a fiduciary duty of loyalty to the source of information.111 In
O’Hagan, the source of information was a company, Grand
Metropolitan PLC (Grand Met) that intended to buy another firm,
Pillsbury Co.112 Grand Met had hired defendant James O’Hagan’s
law firm in connection with the purchase.113 O’Hagan then went on to
buy shares of Pillsbury, the acquisition target, and resold them when
they rose as a result of the public takeover announcement.114 In other
103. See, e.g., Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 544 & n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d,
533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008). For a discussion of specialist fiduciary duty, see infra
Parts I.E, III.B, III.C, and III.D.
104. See, e.g., United States v. Hunt, No. 05 CR. 395(DAB), 2006 WL 2613754, at
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) (citing De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d
1293, 1308–09 (2d Cir. 2002); Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d
Cir. 1999); Bissel v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 937 F. Supp. 237, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
105. See supra note 99.
106. See Dial, 757 F.2d at 167–68 (equating trading ahead to insider trading).
107. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997) (citations
omitted) (discussing the “classical” and “misappropriation” theories of insider
trading).
108. See id. at 651.
109. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227–29 (1980); Cady, Roberts &
Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-6668, 40 S.E.C. 907, at *3 (Nov. 8, 1961) (stating
that an insider of a corporation must either disclose her information to the
shareholders or forego trading on the security).
110. See 521 U.S. at 652.
111. See id.
112. See id. at 647.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 648.
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words, the holding of O’Hagan was that a fiduciary of a buyer
corporation115 owed a duty, to the buyer, not to buy the shares of a
company whose shares the principal (the buyer) wanted to buy.
O’Hagan had “misappropriated” information: the knowledge of the
buyer’s intention to buy shares of a company, before that intention
was made public.116 At this point, it is useful to note the similarity of
the misappropriation theory of insider trading to trading ahead: in
both scenarios, a fiduciary knows that a principal will be making a
purchase and then buys ahead of the principal, knowing that the value
of the thing purchased shall increase as a result of the principal’s
purchase.117 In both situations the principal is robbed of the ability to
make use of its information for its sole benefit.118
E.

The Fiduciary Duties of Specialists

There are two components to understanding the fiduciary duties of
specialists. First, when does fiduciary duty attach to the actions of
specialists?119 And second, if some fiduciary duty does exist, what are
the contours of that fiduciary duty?120

1.

Establishing Fiduciary Duty

One commentator, in arguing that specialists stood to gain from
old-fashioned insider trading, said, without explaining, that specialists
owed a fiduciary duty to their customers when trading on their
behalf.121 And, early courts were quite ready to identify specialists as

115. Lawyers are fiduciaries of companies during buy-out deals. Dirks v. SEC, 463
U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
116. See O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652–53.
117. Compare United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 165–68 (7th Cir. 1985)
(describing the practice of trading ahead), with O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647–48
(describing the acts of O’Hagan in purchasing the stock of his principal’s acquisition
target before the acquisition did and making a tidy profit when the target was finally
bought).
118. Compare Dial, 757 F.2d at 165–66, 168 (describing the damage to the
customers of a broker when the broker traded ahead), with O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654
(citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25–27 (1987)) (describing the damage
to a principal when a fiduciary misappropriates the principal’s information).
119. A discussion of whether and when fiduciary duties attach to the actions of
specialists follows infra Part I.E.1.
120. For a discussion of the kinds of fiduciary duties there are between agents and
principles, see infra Part I.E.2.
121. See Note, The Downstairs Insider: The Specialist and Rule 10b-5, 42 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 695, 697 (1967) (“As broker, the specialist holds and executes orders for the
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fiduciaries of their customers.122 At the very least, early courts held
that the specialist was a subagent of the customer’s broker, who was,
in turn, an agent of the public customer.123 Subagency is sufficient to
establish fiduciary duty between the principal and subagent.124
Although this duty can indeed be modified by contract,125 specialists
do not have contracts with their public customers that relieve them of
any fiduciary duties.126
Prior to the specialist prosecutions, there was the 1993 case of
Market Street Limited Partners v. Englander Capital Corp. that held
specialists to have the same fiduciary obligations as brokers.127 The
duties of brokers are of best execution, which means getting their
customers the best available price.128 From there, the law gets rather
public on a commission basis. When he does so he is an agent and has a fiduciary
obligation to his principal, the purchaser or seller of stock.”).
122. See Helfhat v. Whitehouse, 179 N.E. 493, 495–96 (N.Y. 1932) (noting that a
“contract between a broker and his customer is primarily one of agency,” and that
“[w]here a broker executes an order through a subagent called a floor broker or
specialist, the subagent is ordinarily under the same restrictions as the original
broker” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also Hall v. Paine, 112 N.E. 153,
158 (Mass. 1916) (“A broker’s obligation to his principal [seller] requires him to
secure the highest price obtainable . . . .”).
123. See Helfhat, 179 N.E. at 495–96. As noted above, the Dial court ruled that
brokers were fiduciaries of their customers. Dial, 757 F.2d at 168 (citing Marchese v.
Shearson Hayden Stores, Inc., 734 F.2d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1984)).
124. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.15(1) (2006); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 428(1)–(2) (1958); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 428
(1933).
125. See Helfhat, 179 N.E. at 496 (discussing customs of exchanges that might
modify fiduciary duty).
126. Indeed, specialists at the NYSE are bound to put the interests of their
customers first, before trading for their own benefit. See supra note 36 and
accompanying text. Thus, it would be quite hard to conclude that specialists are
relieved by contract of fiduciary duties to their public customers, if one were inclined
to make such an argument. Compare this to the duties of market makers in “dealer
markets” such as the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotations (NASDAQ), where market makers actually publish the prices at which
they will agree to buy and sell the securities in which they specialize, putting their
customers on notice that the market maker will be between (i.e., interposed
themselves between) the buyer and the seller of a security, and capture the difference
in prices. See Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266,
268 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc).
127. Mkt. St. Ltd. Partners v. Englander Capital Corp., No. 92 CIV. 7434 (LMM),
1993 WL 212817, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1993) (citing Helfnat, 179 N.E. at 496;
Note, supra note 121, at 697).
128. Newton, 135 F.3d at 270; United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir.
1985) (citing Marchese v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 734 F.2d 414, 418 (9th Cir.
1984)); Mkt. St., 1993 WL 212817, at *9 (citing Fustok v. Conticommodity Servs. Inc.,
618 F. Supp. 1082, 1088 (S.D.N.Y.1985)).
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muddled. The Second Circuit, in De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns &
Co., stated that a broker has no general fiduciary duty to advise
clients about developments in stock prices unless the broker has been
given discretion to control a customer’s account by the customer.129
There appears to be some confusion over whether brokers are
fiduciaries under New York law,130 but the confusion is one between
kinds of fiduciary duties.131 It is the difference between the duty to
carry out a requested transaction, which is a fiduciary duty, and the
duty to report the underlying business-information for that
transaction, which is not a fiduciary duty that brokers owe to their
customers.132 Therefore, though a broker does not owe a fiduciary
duty of updating the customer about business developments, a broker
does owe a fiduciary duty of best execution.133 While on the topic of
establishing agency, it is worthwhile to note that compensation is not
a necessary requirement for the creation of agency.134 Rather, agency
is created when a principal consents for an agent to act on her behalf,
the agent also consents to this, and the principal retains control over
the agent.135

2.

Fiduciary Duties

Agents have two kinds of fiduciary duties: loyalty and care.136 The
duty of loyalty, inter alia, includes three particular duties. First, an
agent cannot “acquire a material benefit from a third party in
connection with transactions conducted . . . on behalf of the
principal.”137 This includes the “secret profits” doctrine that an agent
cannot profit from her interaction with a third party through the use
of the agent’s position of agency.138 This also includes the doctrine of
129. 306 F.3d 1293, 1302 (2d Cir. 2002).
130. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. There is no requirement that an agent be paid. There need only be agreement
between an agent and principal that the agent shall act on behalf of the principal.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).
135. Id.
136. See id. §§ 8.01, 8.08 (noting duties “to act loyally” and “to act with [] care,”
“[s]ubject to any agreement with the principal”).
137. Id. § 8.02.
138. See Reading v. The King, (1948) 2 K.B. 268, 275 (U.K.) (“[If] the position
which [the agent] occupies [is] the real cause of his obtaining the money, as distinct
from being a mere opportunity of getting it . . . then he is accountable for it to the
[principal]. . . . It is a case where the servant has unjustly enriched himself by virtue

ASUDULAYEV_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

WHEN SPECIALISTS INTERPOSITION

5/27/2013 7:26 PM

933

“corporate opportunity,” that an agent who receives a business
opportunity that both she and her principal might take should not
take it upon herself to decide whether the employer should take the
opportunity.139 Second, there is the duty “not to use . . . confidential
information of the principal for the agent’s own purposes.”140 This is a
restatement of the holding of O’Hagan.141 Third, there is a duty on
the part of an agent not to serve more than one principal in the same
transaction, without those principals’ consent.142 Similarly, the correct
course of action for an agent faced with either secret profits or an
opportunity that rightfully belongs to the principal is to disclose to the
principal the nature of the situation and let the principal make the
final decision.143
One interesting point in conjunction with specialists and brokers is
the problem of a fiduciary having two conflicting principals. The
Restatement (Third) of Agency allows this configuration to exist, but
only when both principals know that their agent is working for them
both at the same time.144 The agent is to communicate all relevant
information to her principals145 and must resign her position as agent

of his service without his master’s sanction.” (emphasis added)); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. b (2006); cf. Jerlyn Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Wayne R.
Roman Yacht Brokerage, 950 F.2d 60, 63–64, 67 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that a
broker’s non-disclosure of a rebate, who was seller, was a “secret profit”).
139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.02 cmt. d (2006); cf. Gen. Auto. Mfg.
Co. v. Singer, 120 N.W.2d 659, 663 (Wis. 1963) (discussing the corporate opportunity
doctrine in relation to an agent’s duty to not take opportunities that are sent to the
principal).
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.05(2) (2006).
141. See id. § 8.05 reporter’s note c (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
(1997)); supra note 116 and accompanying text.
142. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06(2)(b) (2006).
143. An act that would otherwise violate the duties of loyalty is allowable if the
principal consents, which requires the agent to disclose all material facts. Id. §
8.06(1)(a)(ii) (an agent must “disclose[] all material facts that the agent knows, has
reason to know, or should know would reasonably affect the principal’s judgment
unless the principal has manifested that such facts are already known by the principal
or that the principal does not wish to know them,” in order to obtain the principal’s
consent for an action that would otherwise be a violation of the duty of loyalty); see
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997) (noting “undisclosed, self-serving
use of principal’s information”); Gen. Auto. Mfg. Co. v. Singer, 120 N.W.2d 659, 663
(Wis. 1963) (“Rather than to resolve the conflict of interest between his side line
business and [the principal’s] business in favor of serving and advancing his own
personal interests, [the agent] had the duty to exercise good faith by disclosing to [the
principal] all the facts regarding this matter.”).
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06(2)(b)(i) (2006); accord
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 392 (1958).
145. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06(2)(b)(ii) (2006).
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if her duties to one principal prevent her from revealing information
to another principal that the latter would reasonably want to know in
a given transaction.146 Yet, an agent is not expected to reveal the
reservation prices147 of one principal to another, because that
information is confidential.148
But, while reservation prices may be confidential, bid and offer
prices are not (even if they are still non-public): an agent is expected
to reveal the bid and offer prices of two adverse parties to each
other.149 In Jerlyn Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Wayne R. Roman Yacht
Brokerage, the First Circuit, applying Massachusetts law, held that
where an agent first failed to tell the buyer that his seller would
indeed accept a bid for $800,000, and then, when the buyer raised the
bid to $850,000, the agent failed to tell the seller of the raised bid and
captured the difference for himself, there was a potential breach of
fiduciary duty.150 The fiduciary duty was owed to both the seller and
the buyer.151 The corollary is that the agent had a duty to disclose to
his two principals, the buyer and the seller, their respective bid and
offer prices.152
F.

Economic Terminology and a Dose of Legal Realism:

146. See id. §§ 8.03 cmt. b, 8.06 cmt. d(2).
147. The reservation price is the highest price that a buyer is willing to pay, or the
lowest price that a seller is willing to collect. Reservation Price, NEGOTIATION
EXPERTS, http://www.negotiations.com/definition/reservation-price/ (last visited Feb.
15, 2013); cf. THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 374 (David W. Pearce
ed., The Macmillan Press 4th ed. 1992) (1981) (defining a reservation wage as the
lowest wage that an employee might take).
148. Hirsch v. Schwartz, 209 A.2d 635, 639 (N.J. 1965) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 392 cmt. b (1958)).
149. Jerlyn Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Wayne R. Roman Yacht Brokerage, 950 F.2d 60,
67–68 (1st Cir. 1991).
150. Id. The procedural posture of the case was an appeal over a jury instruction.
The court did not consider whether there was a breach of fiduciary duty because the
jury had to decide whether the $50,000 price difference was a material fact that the
seller or buyer might have cared about. See id. at 68–69. The plaintiffs were the
buyer and the seller, while the defendant was the broker. Id. at 61–62.
151. See id. at 68 (“Plainly it was an open question whether [the agent] did not
violate this principle [the duty to abstain from secret profits] here when (a) he may
have concealed from [the buyer] information that [the seller] had accepted the
former’s $800,000 offer, and (b) he faxed the $800,000 agreement to [the seller] for
signature without advising [the seller] that [the buyer] had, in fact, raised his offer to
$850,000.”).
152. See id. (noting that the broker could have carried out his duty if he had
disclosed to the parties either their actual bid and offer or his intent to take a higher
commission than initially agreed upon); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §
8.06(2)(b)(ii) (2006).
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Arbitrage and Rent
Finally, it is worthwhile to consider specialist interpositioning as it
affects the wider economy. The late Professor Lon Fuller argued that
laws exist to solve problems: there is a nexus between formal
doctrines and the social problems that they address.153 All legal rules,
therefore, can be defined through their associated problems.154 This
was so, argued Professor Fuller, because though legislators could not
foresee every possible outcome or problem, they could think about
concepts, which could take different shapes with a constant, common
element.155 Hence, to fully evaluate the practice of interpositioning
from Professor Fuller’s partially Legal Realist perspective,156 one
ought to have some idea of the economic nature of the activities that
are prohibited by the anti-fraud provisions of Rule 10b-5, compared
with other similar but beneficent economic activities.
Interpositioning has been called a form of arbitrage.157 Arbitrage is
[a]n operation involving simultaneous purchase and sale of an asset,
e.g. a commodity or currency, in two or more markets between
which there are price difference or discrepancies. The arbitrageur
aims to profit from the price difference; the effect of his action is to
lessen or eliminate the price difference.158

It is often argued that arbitrage is socially beneficial because it
leads the price of a good or asset to be the same in two different
markets, avoiding the inefficiency of a good being over- or undervalued anywhere.159
153. For example, Professor Fuller argued that were society to erase the doctrine
of consideration from the law, society’s solution to the problems that the doctrine
addressed would probably take a similar form to that doctrine. See Lon L. Fuller,
Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 824 (1941).
154. See id.
155. Lon L. Fuller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429, 446–47 (1934).
156. Professor Fuller did not consider himself a proper Legal Realist because of his
view that legal concepts had value, compared with the view that he ascribed to Karl
Llewellyn, that legal concepts had no value. See id. at 443–44.
157. Finnerty III, 533 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2008).
158. THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 147, at 17.
159. E. Glen Weyl, Is Arbitrage Socially Beneficial? (Oct. 2007) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://home.uchicago.edu/weyl/Second_Draft_
Arbitrage.pdf. Arbitrage is something that is impossible in a general equilibrium. See
Leonidas C. Koutsougeras & Konstantinos G. Papadopoulos, Arbitrage and
Equilibrium in Strategic Security Markets, 23 ECON. THEORY 553, 553–54 (2004)
(explaining that arbitrage is only possible in markets where there is no equilibrium).
A general equilibrium is when prices have set in and do not change because they are
perfect for an economic system. THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS,
supra note 147, at 169.
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Another potentially useful economic term for this discussion is
economic rent. Economic rent is “[a] payment to a factor in excess of
what is necessary to keep it to its present employment.”160 Rent is
generally considered an undeserved income (the earner has done
nothing to earn it), in that if the income were removed (or, rather, the
portion of it that is economic rent) the earner would not stop her
activity, if any.161 The nineteenth century economist David Ricardo
explained that rent is essentially what is paid for that which would
happen with or without that payment, using the example of timber
that might grow in Norway.162 Ricardo distinguished the price paid
for removing trees from Norway, the payment for the wages of the
movers and also the rarity of the product, from payment for the
ability to grow trees; for trees would always grow, regardless of
whether anyone was paid.163 The corollary is that rent is essentially
windfall income, such as when a landlord takes income for the fact
that she owns a field on which trees grow, despite the fact that the
trees would grow there with or without that landlord, or any
landlord.164 In other words, rent is income associated with a legal
position rather than income due to some form of production—it is a
pure wealth transfer between the person owning the property and the
person interested in making use of it, rather than payment for a good
or service.165
Where there is rent, there is another phenomenon called rentseeking, whereby individuals seek the windfall that is rent.166 The

160. THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 147, at 121. A
definition better grounded in the origin of the term is the excess of what a factor
receives not over what is necessary to keep it to its current employment but over any
employment. See id. For a general discussion of these two different conceptions of
economic rent, see A. Ross Shepherd, Economic Rent and Industry Supply Curve, 37
S. ECON. J. 209 (1970).
All references to ‘rent’ or ‘economic rent’ are
interchangeable; this Note does not deal with the “rent” that landlords take from
their tenants.
161. See MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 147, at 121
(implying that a laborer that receives a rent wage would remain employed even if it
were taken away).
162. See DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND
TAXATION 33–34 (J.M. Dent & Sons 1911) (1817).
163. See id. (distinguishing between the “liberty of removing and selling the
timber” from “the liberty of growing it”).
164. Cf. id.
165. Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W.
ECON. J. 224, 229 (1967).
166. See Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent Seeking Society, 64
AM. ECON. REV. 291, 302–03 (1974) (discussing rent in the form of import licenses).
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existence of rent leads individuals to expend their economic resources
to have the right to those rents (to that windfall income), rather than
expand economic resources on producing wealth.167 A good example
is given by Professor Gordon Tullock, who shows that in a pure
transfer of wealth situation, individuals will spend resources on
attempting to either prevent or bring about the wealth transfer.168
Specifically, thievery is a wealth transfer.169 And, just as a thief will
expend resources to get thieving equipment, so too will individuals
pay for the police, courts, and locks to prevent the thief from
“transferring” wealth away from them.170 The end cost is that instead
of using its resources to produce something else, society winds up
spending resources to prevent something from happening, while the
thief, instead of producing something, spends resources to take
something from someone else.171
Rent-seeking, where parties
compete with each other to capture rent income, has essentially the
same effect: rather than expanding resources to produce, people
expend resources in order to compete with each other for rent
income.172
With this background it will be possible to appreciate the real
economic nature of interpositioning.173
II. THE CONFLICT: THE COURTS’ AND THE GOVERNMENT’S
ANALYSES OF INTERPOSITIONING AND FRAUD
On the one side, the court decisions that culminated with Finnerty
III174 ruled that specialists’ interpositioning was not a fraud in
violation of Rule 10b-5.175 On the other, the government tried to
make a case that specialists were agents of their customers, owed
fiduciary duties to those customers, and by breaching those fiduciary

167. See James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and the
Laws of Succession, 26 J. L. & ECON. 71, 83 (1983) ("By contrast, rent seeking is
socially inefficient because the process in itself creates no value while utilizing scarce
resources.”); Krueger, supra note 166, at 295 (explaining the difference between
trade tariffs and import licenses from the perspective of rent-seeking).
168. Tullock, supra note 165, at 229–31.
169. See id. at 228.
170. See id. at 229–31.
171. See id.
172. Cf. Krueger, supra note 166, at 301–03.
173. For a discussion of whether and how interpositioning fits into these economic
categories, see infra Part III.A.
174. 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008).
175. Id.
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duties had committed fraud.176 Before any of the prosecutions went
to trial, the SEC and the NYSE decided that interpositioning was
simply deceptive, and thereby fraud, without reaching the question of
fiduciary duty.177
A. The Logic of the Courts
There are five reported court decisions that discuss the specialist
prosecutions. In the beginning, there were three similar motions to
dismiss where the courts first looked at the sort of evidence that
would be needed to make the government’s case: United States v.
Bongiorno,178 United States v. Hunt,179 and Finnerty I.180 Then came
Finnerty’s motion to set aside his guilty verdict, Finnerty II.181 Finally
came the government’s appeal of the District Court’s decision to set
aside Finnerty’s conviction, Finnerty III.182
At the motion to dismiss stage, the Bongiorno, Hunt, and Finnerty
I courts separated Rule 10b-5 into its three prongs and held that
violations of prongs (a) and (c), prohibiting fraud, could be proved at
trial by the government.183 At this point, the courts agreed that, in
principle, interpositioning could be found to be a form of fraud
because customers likely did not expect that their trades would not be
getting the best price, when the rules of the exchanges spoke to the
contrary.184
But, the Bongiorno court ruled that even if specialists did owe a
fiduciary duty of best execution to their customers, as do brokers, a

176. See, e.g., Government’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s
Pretrial Motions at 13–16, United States v. Hunt, No. 05 CR. 395(DAB), 2006 WL
2613754 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006), 2006 WL 5149675 [hereinafter Government
Memorandum in Hunt].
177. E.g., Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-49499, 82 SEC
Docket 1895, at *2, 8 (Mar. 30, 2004); see Bear Wagner, Inc., New York Stock
Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-51, ¶¶ 29–30 (Mar. 29, 2004).
178. No. 05 Cr. 390(SHS), 2006 WL 1140864 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2006).
179. No. 05 CR. 395(DAB), 2006 WL 2613754 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006).
180. Nos. 05 Cr. 393 DC, 05 Cr. 397 DC, 2006 WL 2802042 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2006).
181. Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
182. Finnerty III, 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008). As a result of this decision, two
other specialist convictions were overturned, without any extra discussion of the
merits of the case. See United States v. Hayward, 284 F. App’x 857 (2d Cir. 2008).
183. Finnerty I, 2006 WL 2802042, at *4–5; Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *4;
Bongiorno, 2006 WL 1140864, at *5–6.
184. Finnerty I, 2006 WL 2802042, at *5 (citing Bongiorno 2006 WL 1140864, at
*6–7); Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *4 (citing Bongiorno, 2006 WL 1140864, at *6–7);
Bongiorno, 2006 WL 1140864, at *6–7.
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violation of such a duty does not rise to a fraud, and therefore could
not, in and of itself, constitute a deception.185 The court added that,
without a statement that was itself made misleading or deceptive by
an omission, an omission (a failure to do something) could not be the
basis of fraud.186 The Finnerty I court adopted the reasoning of the
Bongiorno court, agreeing that even if specialists did have a fiduciary
duty to their customers, its violation, without a misstatement or a
statement that was made deceptive by an omission, was not a Rule
10b-5 violation.187 In other words, both courts ruled that the
specialists’ failure to get the best price for their customers was not
deceptive because they had never promised any such thing.
The next case was Hunt, where the court agreed with the above188
analysis in Bongiorno and Finnerty I,189 but went further by denying
that specialists had any fiduciary duty at all.190 Specifically, the court
construed New York law to state that brokers owed no fiduciary duty
when they had no discretion over customers’ accounts and acted only
to effect customers’ orders, citing De Kwiatkowski, among others.191
Since brokers owed no fiduciary duty to their customers, neither did
specialists.192 Thus, the court was able to follow the precedent of an
earlier case, Market Street, without following its conclusion,193

185. Bongiorno, 2006 WL 1140864, at *7–8.
186. See id. at *8–9.
187. Finnerty I, 2006 WL 2802042, at *6–7 (citing Bongiorno, 2006 WL 1140864, at
*8–9). The Finnerty I court also rejected the argument that what Finnerty did was
analogous to over-charging by brokers for securities, because unlike brokers,
specialists do not solicit their customers. Id. at *6 (citing Grandon v. Merrill Lynch &
Co., 147 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 1998)).
188. See supra notes 185–87 and accompanying text.
189. See Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *4.
190. See id. at *5–6.
191. See id. (citing De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 306 F.3d 1293, 1308–09
(2d Cir. 2002); Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999);
Bissel v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 937 F. Supp. 237, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
192. See id. (rejecting the argument that specialists owe a fiduciary duty to their
customers).
193. Market Street stood for the proposition that specialists owe the same fiduciary
duty to their customers that brokers owe to their customers. Mkt. St. Ltd. Partners v.
Englander Capital Corp., No. 92 CIV. 7434 (LMM), 1993 WL 212817, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.
June 14, 1993) (citing Helfhat v. Whitehouse, 179 N.E. 493, 496 (N.Y. 1932)); see also
supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing Market Street). And, the court
also noted that brokers did have a fiduciary duty to their customers. Id. (citing Fustok
v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1082, 1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)). Thus, the
court concluded that specialists had a limited fiduciary duty. See id. The apparent
conflict between Market Street on one side, and Hunt and De Kwiatkowski on the
other, is discussed in Part III.B, infra.
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resulting in the holding: even if specialists had the same fiduciary
duties as brokers, neither had a fiduciary duty to their customers.194
The court also noted that because specialists had to execute both
buy and sell orders that met in the middle, at the specialists trading
desk,195 if a specialist owed a fiduciary duty to anyone, she would owe
it to both buyer and seller, implying that this was another reason that
specialists could not be said to owe a fiduciary duty to their
customers.196 The court then distinguished Market Street on the
ground that specialists in the earlier case were paid, while, in Hunt,
the government did not allege that specialists received compensation
from their customers.197 Finally, the court noted that even if there
were a breach, and if mere omissions could be fraud, the
government’s case would be circular because the only omission that
the government could pin on the defendants was that they omitted to
state a breach of fiduciary duty.198 The court found the argument that
a disclosure duty could be breached by failing to mention that one
was breaching that disclosure duty to be circular.199
After the Bongiorno, Hunt, and Finnerty I cases had their motions
to dismiss denied,200 a jury convicted Finnerty of a violation of Rule
10b-5, but the court set that verdict aside.201 The court explained that
the defendant could not be convicted when the government had not
proven a violation of any of the prongs of Rule 10b-5.202 Specifically,
the court explained that although prongs (a) and (c) could have been
proven by fraud, this required some proof of what customers had
actually expected of the specialists, while the government had only
furnished proof of what the defendant knew he had to do—there was

194. See Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *5 (“‘[A] specialist has fiduciary obligations
closely resembling, if not identical to, those of a broker.’ However, stockbrokers
generally do not owe a fiduciary duty unless a customer has delegated discretionary
trading authority to that broker.” (quoting Bongiorno, 2006 WL 1140864, at *7)
(citing De Kwiatkowski, 306 F.3d at 1308–09)).
195. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
196. See Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *6 (“[S]pecialists have no loyalty to buyers
and sellers as they execute orders for both . . . .”).
197. See Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *6.
198. Id. at *7.
199. See id.; cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06 (stating that an action
that would have otherwise breached a duty, would not be a breach if the principal
had been informed in advance and consented to the action).
200. See supra notes 178–180.
201. Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), aff’d, 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir.
2008).
202. See id. at 539–40.
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no proof that Finnerty’s customers knew that they were supposed to
be getting the best price for their orders, in line with NYSE rules.203
In its discussion of the utter lack of proof of customer expectations,
the court appeared to be quite angry that it and the jurors felt left out
of the loop:
What, if any, understanding did customers have as to a specialist’s
obligations? What did customers expect when presenting an order
to the specialist? What did customers “trust” the specialists to do?
Did customers even know that a specialist could trade for his
proprietary account? Did customers assume that the specialist was
providing services without charge? Or did customers know that the
specialist was trading for his own account and making a profit? Did
customers believe that they would get the best possible price and, if
so, what was the basis for that belief? Would customers have
thought they had been deceived upon learning that in some trades,
where they bought or sold within their limits or at market price, the
specialist made a profit of a few cents a share for the proprietary
account?
Some of the answers to these questions may be obvious to those
with knowledge of the industry, but none of these questions were
answered by the evidence presented at trial.204

The court then went on to adopt two parts of the Hunt analysis of
fiduciary duty, to put aside the theory that by taking money from his
customers in violation of a fiduciary duty, Finnerty had committed
fraud.205 In particular, the Finnerty II court picked up on the idea that
a specialist would have two principals, if any, and concluded that
specialists therefore could not have any principals.206 And, in a
footnote, the court adopted the idea that since specialists were not
paid—or that since the government had not proved how, if at all,
specialists were paid—the case was distinguishable from Market
Street, which held that specialists were fiduciaries of their
customers.207

203. See id. at 540–42.
204. Id. at 541–42; see also Colesanti, supra note 23, at 28–29 (noting the Finnerty
court’s frustration on this matter).
205. See Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 543–44 & n.10 (citing Hunt, 2006 WL
2613754, at *6).
206. See id. at 543–44 (citing Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *6).
207. See id. at 544 n.10 (citing Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *6).
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The last judicial opinion on interpositioning came with the appeal
of the Finnerty II decision to the Second Circuit, Finnerty III.208 In
Finnerty III, the Second Circuit approached a narrowed argument,
for the government no longer attempted to argue fiduciary duty.209
Rather, the government argued only that Finnerty’s actions were
deceptive and that the evidence at trial proved this.210 The Second
Circuit ruled that there was insufficient evidence to show that
Finnerty had personally misled anyone.211 In passing, the court stated
that it seemed that the government had proven some manner of theft
by Finnerty but that without a showing of fiduciary duty, there could
be no fraud in that.212 The court suggested that conduct, such as theft,
could be deceptive, but only rose to the level of fraud if there were a
breach of fiduciary duty accompanying the theft.213 The court ended
with two points. First, the government could not prove a violation of
customer expectations by pointing to the rules of the NYSE and
stating that Finnerty violated those; there had to be some deception
emanating from Finnerty himself.214 Second, the government could
not argue that a violation of exchange rules was a violation of the
securities laws.215
B.

The Counter-Argument

As noted above, the government gave up the argument that
specialists owed a fiduciary duty by the time the Finnerty case got to

208. See Finnerty III, 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008). This decision was quickly copied
and pasted to overturn the convictions of two other specialists who had been
convicted. See United States v. Hayward, 284 F. App’x 857, 858 (2d Cir. 2008).
209. Reply Brief for the United States of America at 22, Finnerty III, 533 F.3d 143
(2d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1104-CR), 2008 WL 6610969.
210. Id. at 10–27.
211. See Finnerty III, 533 F.3d at 149.
212. See id. at 148 (citing In re Refco Capital Mkts., Ltd. Brokerage Customer Sec.
Litig., No. 06 Civ. 643(GEL), 2007 WL 2694469, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2007)).
Refco Capital, in turn, cited SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 823 (2002) (citing
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (noting that purchases of
securities that show a breach of fiduciary duty and are undisclosed to the principal
are fraud and therefore deceptive)). See also supra Part I.C.
213. See Finnerty III, 533 F.3d at 148 (citing Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158-59 (2008); Refco Capital, 2007 WL 2694469,
at *8).
214. Id. at 149–50 (citing Lattanzio v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 476 F.3d 147 (2d
Cir. 2007)).
215. Id. at 150–51 (citing Shemtob v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445
(2d Cir. 1971)).
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the Second Circuit.216 At the trial stage, the government had argued
that specialists did owe a duty to their public customers.217 The
government tried to argue that specialists owed a duty of best
execution to their customers.218 Specialists have the same duties as
brokers and, therefore, specialists owe a duty of best execution: to
obtain the best possible price for their customers.219 Therefore, a
specialist’s failure to disclose her failure to get the best price for her
customer was a violation of Rule 10b-5.220 The government similarly
argued that interpositioning was a fraudulent scheme, and therefore a
violation of Rule 10b-5 subsections (a) and (c).221
Even before the issue went to the federal courts, the SEC found
that interpositioning had violated Rule 10b-5.222 Unfortunately, as
these were settlement proceedings,223 the SEC did not undertake
216. See Reply Brief, supra note 209, at 22.
217. See Government Memorandum in Hunt, supra note 176, at 13–15. The
government argued that specialists have a fiduciary duty to their public customers in
an identical way in all of the specialist prosecutions. C.f, e.g., Government’s
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Pretrial Motions at 14–17,
Finnerty I, Nos. 05 Cr. 393 (DC), 05 Cr. 397 (DC) (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2006), 2006 WL
4793068.
218. See, e.g., Government Memorandum in Hunt, supra note 176, at 13–15 (citing
Newton v. Merrill Lynch Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1998) (en
banc); Mkt. St. Ltd. Partners v. Englander Capital Corp., 1993 WL 212817, at *9
(S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1993)).
219. See, e.g., id.
220. See, e.g., id. at 15–16 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228
(1980)). The distinction between an ordinary breach of fiduciary duty and a violation
of Rule 10b-5 was that the latter was deceptive. See, e.g., id. at 18.
221. See, e.g., id. at 11–12.
222. E.g., Fleet Specialist, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-49499, 82 SEC
Docket 1895, at *2, 8 (Mar. 30, 2004); Van Der Moolen Specialists USA, LLC,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-49,502, 82 SEC Docket 1920, at *2, 7–8 (Mar. 30,
2004), 2005 WL 626564.
223. E.g., Fleet Specialist, Inc., 82 SEC Docket 1895, at *1 n.1 (“The findings
herein are made pursuant to [Fleet Street’s settlement] Offer and are not binding on
any other person or entity in this or any other proceeding.”); Van Der Moolen
Specialists USA, LLC, 83 S.E.C. Docket 2366, at *1 n.1 (“The findings herein are
made pursuant to [Van Der Moolen’s settlement] Offer and are not binding on any
other person or entity in this or any other proceeding.”). The SEC has the power to
settle cases before they reach final adjudication before an administrative law judge;
these settlements produce opinions called Consent Judgments. See U.S. S.E.C. v.
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 161–62 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing U.S. S.E.C. v.
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)) (discussing
the practice of the SEC to settle the majority of its administrative adjudications). In
Consent Judgments, the party charged neither admits nor denies wrongdoing, but
agrees to pay a stiff fine. Id. Regardless of what the SEC says may have happened,
the party charged does not admit anything, and the decision is not binding on any
other party; hence, these Consent Judgments have no precedential value. See id.
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much of a legal analysis of the situation. The NYSE undertook a
similar action and also found a violation of Rule 10b-5.224 The SEC
and the NYSE found deception, and thus fraud, in the actions of
specialists being the lynch pin of a Rule 10b-5 violation by stating:
[s]pecialists impliedly represent to their customers that they are
dealing fairly with the public in accordance with the standards and
practices applicable to specialists, namely, that they are limiting
their dealer transactions to those “reasonably necessary to maintain
a fair and orderly market.” A specialist’s failure to comply with this
implied representation, if done with scienter, can constitute a
violation of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.225

There was no mention of fiduciary duty in these decisions.
Some commentators have agreed that specialists are fiduciaries of
their customers. A student note predating the interpositioning
prosecutions states that when a specialist is trading on behalf of a
customer, she has a fiduciary duty to that customer.226 Another
commentator suggests that the government’s case “exhibited a few
prosecutorial shortcuts and presumptions,” and simply failed to show
deception.227 Nevertheless, he notes that “the [s]pecialist as agent
broker would still arguably owe a fiduciary duty to the public
customer.”228
Finally, in an ongoing class action against specialists, the Southern
District of New York suggested that knowledge by specialist firms of
their employees’ interpositioning was sufficient to show scienter on

224. Bear Wagner, Inc., New York Stock Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-51,
¶¶ 5, 38, 40, 42 (Mar. 29, 2004), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/04-051.pdf.
225. Fleet Specialist, Inc., 2004 WL 626580, at *8 (citing Newton v. Merrill Lynch
Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc); Mkt. St. Ltd.
Partners v. Englander Capital Corp., No. 92 CIV. 7434 (LMM), 1993 WL 212817
(S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1993)); Van Der Moolen Specialists USA, LLC, Exchange Act
Release No. 49502, 2004 WL 626564, at *8 (Mar. 30, 2004) (citing the same sources);
Bear Wagner, Inc., New York Stock Exchange Hearing Panel Decision 04-51, ¶ 40
(citing the same sources). All three of these sources have the same paragraph,
verbatim. For a discussion of why the SEC’s view that interpositioning constituted
fraud because it entailed deception was not accorded any deference, see supra note
60.
226. See Note, supra note 121, at 697. This discussion, nevertheless, was not about
interpositioning, but rather about the ability of specialists to engage in old-fashioned
insider trading because of their greater access to corporate inside information, due to
their positions as traders of those companies’ stocks. See id. at 697–99.
227. See Colesanti, supra note 23, at 27.
228. See id. at 26 (citing Mkt. St., 1993 WL 212817, at *31, 33).
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the part of the firms.229 The court added also that the clients of the
specialists could rely on “honesty and integrity of the NYSE.”230 Only
time will tell whether the class is able to prove that the specialists
committed fraud by interpositioning231—unless there is a settlement
before that, which is likely as settlement negotiations are ongoing.232
The class does not appear to be arguing that the specialists had any
fiduciary duties to the class, as agents of the class.
III. WHO’S RIGHT?
The outcome of the specialist prosecutions appears to be based on
a misunderstanding of the law of agency.233 Yet, the courts’ mistakes
can be excused by the incomplete analysis of fiduciary duty given by
the prosecution, who did not deal with the nuance that specialists’
fiduciary duties are multi-dimensional. Specifically, specialists have a
duty to get their customers the best price, but do not have a duty to
constantly update them with information.234 Thus, the courts could be
excused for taking the absence of one fiduciary duty to mean the total
absence of all fiduciary duties.235
A. Economic Analysis for Legal Realism
Returning to the ideas of Professor Fuller, discussed in Part I.F,236
what is the economic nature of interpositioning? Is it a problem of
the same kind that Rule 10b-5 exists to prevent, or is it merely
beneficent arbitrage? To answer this question, it is useful to consider
what sort of economic problem Rule 10b-5 has been shown to
address.

229. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 405 F. Supp. 2d 281, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 2005),
rev’d on other grounds, 503 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007); see NYSE Specialists, 260 F.R.D.
at 75 (noting that the lead plaintiff may be able “to identify the Specialist Firms’
illegal conduct in a uniform manner and can be used to determine whether illegal
conduct occurred without necessitating a trade-by-trade review”).
230. NYSE Specialists, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 319.
231. Cf. Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 538–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (discussing the
government’s failure to prove fraud), aff’d, 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008).
232. See supra note 66.
233. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999); supra
notes 130–133 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 130–133 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 130–133 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 153–156 and accompanying text.
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Rule 10b-5 combats fraud in connection with the sale or purchase
of a security.237 Fraud, as discussed above, generally takes the shape
of swindling someone.238 Because there is an assumption that an
agent acts loyally to the principal, a disloyal agent is tacitly
deceptive.239 The disloyal action is usually done to make profit from
the agent’s position, without the consent of the principal.240 Profit
comes from information: first, one may fail to tell the principal of
some chance to make a profit (these are the secret profit and
corporate opportunity doctrines,241 and both are easily applied to
classical insider trading242); second, one may use some confidence of
the principal without the principal’s consent, usually this confidence is
about a transaction that shall take place at a given price (the
misappropriation theory variety of insider trading falls into this
category243 as does trading ahead244).
In either of the above cases, the information relates to a
transaction that was not produced by the agent; it was already taking
place. Rather, the agent was free-riding on this transaction in one of
two ways. First, an opportunity was going to the principal because of
the nature of the principal’s position and the agent decided to take it
for herself.245 Or second, the principal had already decided to act, and

237. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 78–79, 137–140 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 137–139 and accompanying text.
242. See supra notes 107–109 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 140, 110–116 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 92• 98 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 241–242 and accompanying text. A potential difficulty arises
with the Secret Profits doctrine, since the doctrine extends to all activities of an agent
that arise as a result of its employment with the principal. See Reading v. The King,
(1948) 2 K.B. 268, 275 (U.K.) (“It matters not that the master has not lost any profit,
nor suffered any damage. Nor does it matter that the master could not have done the
act himself. It is a case where the servant unjustly enriched himself by virtue of his
service without the master’s sanction.”). Thus, these may include potentially new
activities that the principal might not have done on his own. See id. However, the
fiduciary duty of loyalty does not have to deal with only one problem; rather, it can
deal with multiple problems, as any legal doctrine. Cf. Fuller, supra note 153, at 800–
04 (listing the various functions that the doctrine of consideration fulfills). Still, one
easy example of the secret profits rule is when a broker refuses to report to his
principal a commission that he is receiving while watching the principal’s property.
See, e.g., Little v. Phipps, 94 N.E. 260, 260–62 (Mass. 1911). In such a case, the
commission would have come to someone; the agent merely captured it, or redirected
it from the principal. See id.
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the agent made an incidental profit.246 In both of these cases, the
agent has added no value but merely profited from an existing
productive activity brought about by the principal. The agent’s
income is economic rent, just as Ricardo described it, when he said
that to extract rent is to profit from the timber that grows in Norway
that would grow regardless of who, if anyone, owned the land.247 In
other words, the profit to the agent is not necessary for the activity to
take place, but the agent profits from it anyway.248
Thus, one of the functions of the fiduciary duty of loyalty is to
prevent agents from extracting rent from their principals—unless, of
course, this is part of the bargain.249 Fraud, among other things, is the
violation of this duty.250 So, fraud from the violation of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty is rent-seeking, and the profit from the fraud is
extracted rent. So the problem that Rule 10b-5 addresses is rentseeking in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.251
So, what then of interpositioning? Interpositioning has been called
arbitrage,252 and arbitrage is generally a good thing.253
But
interpositioning is not arbitrage. By definition, arbitrage requires one
to find price discrepancies in different markets and then perform the
socially useful task of bringing those prices into line with one
another.254 Specialists, on the other hand, do not search out price
discrepancies; rather, the price discrepancies come to them without
any effort on their part.255
When one retains income for something that happens naturally, or
at least without input on the part of the one retaining the income, that
is called rent.256 Specialists are already compensated for their work by
receiving commissions.257 The nature of a rent is such that if it were
eliminated, the factor that took it would continue to exist,258 like the

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

See supra notes 243–244 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 161–164 and accompanying text.
See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 238–240 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 69, 249–250 and accompanying text.
Finnerty III, 533 F.3d 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2008).
See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 162–164 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 162–164 and accompanying text.
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“original and indestructible powers” of the land.259 This wealth
transfer from traders to specialists is not socially useful because it
incentivizes customers to spend extra time and resources figuring out
what they by definition do not know: the price closest to what a
counterparty might offer or bid, rather than putting those resources
into some other form of wealth creation.260
One might argue that specialists have always understood that part
of their income to be interpositioning income and that indeed this is
what makes a firm agree to such an arrangement with an exchange.261
But one cannot agree to something that one does not know occurs,
and since no one had sued the specialists’ firms before the SEC
uncovered interpositioning, customers were simply not aware of
interpositioning.262 Furthermore, how could customers collectively
agree to ignore the Rules of the NYSE?263 More importantly, the
existence of the opportunity to profit from rent income in this
manner, encourages more entrants into the market than would
otherwise be efficient.264 In other words, financial firms’ resources,
instead of producing wealth, are extracting wealth transfers from the
customers of exchanges.265 Hence, interpositioning is the extraction of
economic rent, and this is precisely the sort of activity that Rule 10b-5
exists to prevent.
B.

Mistakes in the Law and a Fact: Fiduciary Duty, Fraud, and
Rule 10b-5

The chief flaw in the courts’ analyses is that they give short shrift to
the issue of fiduciary duty.266 Their reasoning proceeded as follows:

259. RICARDO, supra note 162, at 34.
260. Cf. Tullock, supra note 165, at 229•31.
261. Cf. Krueger, supra note 166, at 292–93 (discussing the fact that bribes paid to
public servants may be part of the enticement to become public servants).
Remember the exasperation of the court in Finnerty II about its ignorance of the
implied transaction between customers and specialists. See supra note 204 and
accompanying text.
262. Witness the fact that only one lawsuit was brought by the public against
specialists for interpositioning, and only after the SEC uncovered this practice. See In
re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2007); Lucchetti & Scannell,
supra note 48, at C1.
263. The Rules of the NYSE prohibited interpositioning. See supra note 36.
264. See Krueger, supra note 166, at 292 (explaining that the existence of rent
income in the form of quasi-monopoly profits from import licenses creates a larger
number of import firms than is socially useful).
265. Cf. id.
266. See supra notes 191–197, 205–207 and accompanying text.
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for want of fiduciary duty, there was no fraud;267 for want of fraud,
there was no deception;268 for want of deception, there was no
violation of Rule 10b-5269—all for the want of fiduciary duty.
The courts made three basic errors with the issue of fiduciary duty.
First, the courts incorrectly believed that specialists did not receive a
commission from their customers and therefore, were not agents.270
This analysis erred in two respects. First, specialists are paid, if not
directly by customers, then as employees of specialists’ firms that
receive part of the commission for trades that go through them.271
Second, compensation is not a necessary condition of agency.272
Agency is an agreement between the principal and the agent that the
latter will act under the control of the former.273 When a customer
orders a broker to buy at a certain price and that broker orders the
specialist to do so, that is control by a customer. It appears that the
reason the courts, particularly that of Hunt, made such a lunge at the
payment factor was because that was a way to distinguish
uncomfortable precedent.274 But then, payment was not a deciding
factor in Market Street; in that court’s rationale, the term
‘commission’ only appeared in an explanatory parenthetical quote.275
Therefore, the Hunt court erred, as did the courts that cited it,276 when
it said that because specialists were not paid by their customers—
which was not true in the first place—specialists could not be their
agents.

267. See supra notes 212–213 and accompanying text. For a more accurate
discussion of the relation of fiduciary duty and fraud, see supra notes 75–79 and
accompanying text.
268. See supra note 183–184 and accompanying text.
269. See Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Thus, the very
core of the federal securities laws in question is the premise that there must be some
form of deception.”), aff’d, 533 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2008).
270. See supra notes 38–40, 197, 207 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text. If specialist firms are agents of
the customers, and specialists are agents of the firms, then specialists are subagents of
the customers, and therefore owe to the customers the same duties as other agents
would. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.15(1) (2006).
272. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
273. See id.
274. See supra notes 197, 207 and accompanying text.
275. See Mkt. St. Ltd. Partners v. Englander Capital Corp., No. 92 CIV. 7434
(LMM), 1993 WL 212817, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1993) (quoting Note, supra note
121, at 697).
276. See supra notes 205–207 and accompanying text.
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The second, more interesting and bizarre error by the Hunt court
was the torsion of New York law on the fiduciary duties of brokers.277
Accepting arguendo that Market Street was correct in equating the
duties of a specialist to those of a broker, the Hunt court bizarrely
ruled that brokers do not have any fiduciary duties to their customers
anyway.278 On the one hand, it suggested that it was applying Market
Street by accepting its analogy of specialists to brokers, but refused to
accept its resultant conclusion that because brokers had a fiduciary
duty to their customers, so too did specialists, which was the whole
point of the analogy.279 It is not clear why the Hunt court did not
explicitly disagree with Market Street but chose to apply it in this
strange way.
On the other hand, the Hunt court was plainly misled when it
noted that brokers had no fiduciary duties to their customers.
Brokers do have a narrow fiduciary duty to their customers, with
regard to specific transactions: the duty of best execution.280 The
cases that the Hunt court cited stood for the proposition that where a
broker had bought a security on behalf of a buyer, that broker did not
owe that buyer a duty to keep her informed about price changes in
that security.281 None of those cases actually supported the idea that a
broker did not need to get the best possible price for her customerbuyer, even to the detriment of the broker. Perhaps this is why none
of the other specialist prosecution cases went quite as far as Hunt in
that regard. Thus, it must be accepted that brokers do owe a
fiduciary duty of best execution to their customers,282 and therefore,
specialists also owe this fiduciary duty to their customers.283
Yet, the third and most interesting error with the specialist
prosecution cases was the issue of dual principality: that specialists,
even if they were agents, would have two adversely positioned
principals and that therefore, they would be unable to act as their
agents.284 One suspects that that in the back of their minds neither the
courts nor, perhaps, even the government really wanted to deal with
the seemingly complex question of what the duties of a specialist are

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

See supra notes 191–192 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 191–194 and accompanying text.
See Mkt. St., 1993 WL 212817, at *9 (quoting Note, supra note 121, at 697).
See supra notes 127–133 and accompanying text.
See id.
See supra Part I.E.1.
See Mkt. St., 1993 WL 212817, at *9 (quoting Note, supra note 121, at 697).
See supra notes 195–196, 206 and accompanying text.
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when a specialist must act in the best interest of two parties who are
on opposite sides of a transaction. The difficulty was illusory.
An agent may act on behalf of two adversely positioned principals,
as long as both principals are informed of this arrangement.285 There
might appear to be difficulty in the agent’s need to disclose
information “that the agent knows, has reason to know, or should
know would reasonably affect the principal’s judgment.”286 And,
moreover, it is true that an agent whose duty of confidentiality to one
principal prevents her from disclosing such information to another
principal has a duty to resign her post.287 Nevertheless, courts have
held that an agent acting for two otherwise adverse parties is not
required to communicate those two parties’ reservation prices nor
resign because the agent cannot communicate them.288 But, where an
agent has two principals, she has the duty of informing the adverse
parties in a transaction of each other’s actual offers and cannot profit
from their ignorance of each other’s offers.289 This is precisely what
specialists do.290 Indeed, were one to exchange Finnerty for the
broker in Jerlyn Yacht Sales, Finnerty would have been found both a
fiduciary and in violation of his duty to disclose.291
A final correction to Hunt is that what the court thought was
circular—disclosure as the sole duty of a fiduciary292—is not actually
circular. The confusion stems from the rule that breaches of the duty
of loyalty always create a duty to disclose the breach.293 The full duty
of a specialist, then, was either not to engage in interpositioning, by
either setting the transaction in securities at either the price of the bid
or the price of the offer, or by warning her customers that she would
interposition.294 This way, either there would be no interposition, or

285. See supra notes 144–45 and accompanying text.
286. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06(2)(b)(ii) (2006).
287. See id. § 8.06 cmt. d(2).
288. See supra notes 145–148 and accompanying text.
289. Jerlyn Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Wayne R. Roman Yacht Brokerage, 950 F.2d 60, 67
(1st Cir. 1991). See infra Part III.D for a discussion of how specialists’ duties interact
with Rule 10b-5 and § 10(b).
290. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text.
291. Compare supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text (discussing
interpositioning), with supra notes 149–152 and accompanying text (discussing the
duties of a broker between two principals, a buyer and seller with regard to the Jerlyn
Yacht Sale case).
292. United States v. Hunt, No. 05 CR. 395(DAB), 2006 WL 2613754, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) (discussing the government’s “puzzlingly circular” theory).
293. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06.
294. See id.
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the customers would be able to take into account the interpositioning
and make bids and offers that at least took interpositioning into
account.295
C.

And All of the Analogies: Insider Trading and Trading
Ahead

What makes the courts’ decisions so hard to accept is that close
analogies to interpositioning abound, and yet go unnoticed by the
courts.296 Interpositioning resembles other fairly standard forms of
fraud: modern federal law on insider trading states that a fiduciary of
a party that is either acquiring or being acquired in a merger and
acquisition has the duty not to trade on the stock of the acquisition
target, if the information of the future acquisition is not public.297
Specialists also have information that is non-public: the bids and
offers of the different customers for a security.298 Reflection on the
scenario of O’Hagan drives the point home. O’Hagan essentially
interposed himself between the buyer of an asset and the seller. He
knew that the buyer was going to buy a security, at some price higher
than the market price, which was non-public information, and he took
advantage of this non-public information to make money on the
spread between the current market price and the non-public higher
acquisition price.299 Interpositioning is precisely that—making a profit
from the spread between bid and offer prices that are non-public and
known only by the specialist because of his fiduciary relationship to
the customer.300 In other words, interpositioning looks like a
straightforward case of O’Hagan-style misappropriation. And this
form of misappropriation fits in neatly with the fiduciary duty not to
profit from the principal’s property—given that information is a form
of property.301

295. See id.
296. This is, of course, in addition to the similar economic natures of normal 10b-5
fraud and interpositioning, discussed supra Part III.A.
297. These are the classical and misappropriation theories of insider trading,
respectively. See supra notes 106–109 and accompanying text.
298. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. If bids and offers sent to
specialists were public, specialists would not be able to interposition, since buyers and
sellers would change their orders, in an attempt to capture as much of the difference
between the bids and offers as possible.
299. See supra notes 112–116 and accompanying text.
300. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text.
301. See supra notes 140–141 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, interpositioning could be made to look like a classical
form of insider trading by shifting the focus to the seller of the asset,
whose lack of knowledge about an impending purchase by an
acquirer leads her to sell her asset to the insider and lose the ability to
sell her asset later at a higher price.302 Moreover, interpositioning is
open to another form of fiduciary duty analysis: the secret profits and
opportunity doctrines. The secret profits and opportunity doctrines
are, essentially, that an agent is not to derive economic rent from her
position of employment.303 And given that interpositioning is
essentially a rent,304 it is well within the prohibition of the secret
profits doctrine.305
Lastly, one should consider the similarities between trading ahead,
which is fraud,306 and interpositioning.307 Trading ahead is to buy a
security knowing that one’s customer is going to buy it—that is,
guaranteeing oneself an asset whose price is set to rise (if the broker
buys it before the customer’s order is executed).308 Interpositioning
only differs in that, rather than holding onto the security, one simply
sells it off to a guaranteed buyer, thus making money from the buyer
directly, by sale, rather than indirectly, by allowing the buyer’s latter
purchase to push up prices.309 The harm to the final buyer of the
security is the same: in both cases, a buyer gets not the price that the
market (or another offeror) is offering, but a higher price, while the
broker or specialist benefits from being able to have someone else
buy a security that creates value for her, either directly or indirectly.310
The differences between interpositioning and what happened in Dial
are inapposite, since trading ahead is still a breach of the duty of best
302. See supra notes 108–109 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 137–141, 162–164 and accompanying text. To make money
from a third party without actually doing anything except occupying the position of
the principal’s agent is a textbook example of economic rent. See supra notes 162–
164 and accompanying text.
304. See supra Part III.A.
305. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. It is worthwhile to note in the
Jerlyn Yacht Sales case the fiduciary duty discussed was that relating to secret profits.
See Jerlyn Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Wayne R. Roman Yacht Brokerage, 950 F.2d 60, 69
(1st Cir. 1991).
306. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
307. See Daniel A. Klein, Annotation, Prosecution Based on Interpositioning,
Trading Ahead, or Front Running in Connection with Securities Transaction, 56
A.L.R. FED. 2d 619 § 6 (2011).
308. See supra notes 84–85, 88–90 and accompanying text.
309. See supra note 99.
310. Compare supra notes 43–48 and accompanying text, with supra notes 84–90
and accompanying text.
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execution, regardless of whether the broker solicits orders or
passively takes them.311 Since trading ahead is fraud,312 so too is
interpositioning.
D. Of Missing Steps and Synthesis
Of all the specialist prosecution cases, the most complete—if
erroneous—analysis of specialists’ fiduciary duty was that in Hunt.313
There the court, perhaps, came quite close to finding the flaw in the
government’s case: “[Rule 10b-5] liability is premised upon a duty to
disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between
parties to a transaction.”314 The government’s argument boiled down
to this, since specialists owed a duty to get their customers the best
price, they breached this duty by interpositioning, and the failure to
disclose this breach was a fraud.315 The Hunt court believed this
argument to be circular: how could the sole fiduciary duty of a broker
be to disclose its own breach of its fiduciary duty? The Hunt court all
but said that a mere breach of a fiduciary duty is not securities fraud,
unless it is a breach of a duty to disclose.316 This is true, of course:
only breaches of the fiduciary duty of loyalty are fraudulent for the
purposes of Rule 10b-5; one must either forgo the breaching activity
or disclose its nature to the principal.317 Breaches of the fiduciary
duty of care, on the other hand, do not rise to the level of fraud.318
The Hunt court’s discussion of broker’s fiduciary duty was
erroneous.319 The Hunt court’s authorities for its view320 stated
something quite close to the proposition that brokers had no duties of

311. Compare United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1985), with Newton
v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 270 (3d Cir. 1998) (en
banc), and Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs.Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999).
312. See supra Part I.D.1.
313. See supra notes 191–197, 205–207 and accompanying text.
314. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
315. See Government Memorandum in Hunt, supra note 176, at 14, 16 (citations
omitted).
316. See id.
317. Compare Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 (“[Rule 10b-5] liability is premised upon a
duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to
a transaction.”), with Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) (noting
that the lower court’s extension of breach of fiduciary duty into securities fraud was
unwarranted).
318. See sources cited supra note 317.
319. See supra notes 280–281 and accompanying text.
320. United States v. Hunt, No. 05 CR. 395(DAB), 2006 WL 2613754, at *5
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006).
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disclosure to their clients, which would have worked to take broker
breaches of fiduciary duty—whatever those duties might be—out of
Rule 10b-5. For it has been said that a broker owes no duty to a
normal customer to disclose information about the movements of a
stock, unless that broker is charged with managing that stock.321 So
perhaps the Hunt court was groping for the following argument: if
brokers owe no disclosure duty to their clients,322 and specialists owe
the same duties as brokers,323 then specialists, too, have no disclosure
duty, and therefore cannot violate Rule 10b-5 through breach of
fiduciary duty, since the only fiduciary duty whose violation is a fraud
for Rule 10b-5 is that of the fiduciary duty to disclose.324
This argument is plausible, and it is the best argument that the
Hunt court and the courts that cited Hunt could have used.325 But this
argument is incorrect for the simple reason that the disclosure duty
that the De Kwiatkowski court had in mind was the fiduciary duty of
reasonable care: to disclose to the client information about the stock
that the client would not otherwise know.326 There was no mention of
a duty of loyalty, which is a duty to disclose potentially lucrative
business opportunities.327 Similarly, the other cases that discuss the
duties of brokers pinpoint the scope of duty to the execution of the
trade, but do not limit the duty of loyalty therein.328 The duty of
loyalty, on the other hand, always carries with it a duty to disclose.329
321. De Kwiatkowski v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 306 F.3d 1293, 1307–08 (2d Cir.
2002) (citing Caravan Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., 769
F.2d 561, 567 (9th Cir. 1995); Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461
F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981); Robbinson v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 107, 112 (N.D. Ala. 1971),
aff’d, 453 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1972); Puckett v. Rufenacht, Bromagen & Hertz, Inc.,
587 So. 2d 273, 280 (Miss. 1991)).
322. See id.
323. Mkt. St. Ltd. Partners v. Englander Capital Corp., No. 92 CIV. 7434 (LMM),
1993 WL 212817, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1993) (citing Note, supra note 121, at 697).
324. Compare Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980) (“[Rule 10b-5]
liability is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and
confidence between parties to a transaction.”), with Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) (noting that the lower court’s extension of breach of
fiduciary duty into securities fraud was unwarranted).
325. See, e.g., Finnerty II, 474 F. Supp. 2d 530, 533–34 & n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(citing Hunt, 2006 WL 2613754, at *6).
326. See De Kwiatkowski, 306 F.3d at 1307–08.
327. See supra notes 137–141 and accompanying text.
328. See, e.g., Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999)
(noting the limited scope of fiduciary duty while reconciling New York state cases on
the topic).
329. See supra note 137–143 and accompanying text.
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Like any broker must, every specialist must do everything possible so
that her customer gets the best possible execution of an order.330 This
entails disclosing to the customer the identity of the principal,331 all
the information that is relevant for the principal to make an informed
decision about that order, which includes the opportunity332 that the
specialist would take to interpose herself between both customers,
and take away from them the potential benefit of their bargain.333
Insider trading and trading ahead are both violations of the duty of
loyalty by agents because those agents use the informational property
of their principals, without the principals’ knowledge, to profit
themselves.334 That interpositioning is similar to a violation of the
duty of loyalty is clear from the analogous nature of interpositioning
Therefore,
to both trading ahead and insider trading.335
interpositioning is a violation of the duty of loyalty (which is the duty
of disclosure), like insider trading,336 and the failure to disclose
matures to a violation of Rule 10b-5 and Section 10(b).337 As such,
interpositioning must take its place amongst its close analogues as a
violation of the duty of loyalty, and therefore, a form of fraud, which,
in connection with a purchase or sale of a security, is a violation of
Rule 10b-5.

330. See supra Part I.E.I.
331. See supra Part I.E.1.
332. See supra Part I.E.2.
333. See supra notes 43–47 and accompanying text.
334. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 8.05 & cmt. c, 8.06(1)(a)(2)
(noting that “it is a breach of an agent’s duty to use confidential information of the
principal for the purpose of effecting trades in securities although the agent does not
reveal the information in the course of trading” and that to avoid a breach of
fiduciary duty an agent must obtain the principal’s consent forth use of the principal’s
information and “disclose[] all material facts that the agent knows, has reason to
know, or should know would reasonably affect the principal’s judgment unless the
principal has manifested that such facts are already known by the principal or that
the principal does not wish to know them”), with United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S.
642, 652 (1997) (noting that it is a “fiduciary’s undisclosed, self-serving use of a
principal’s information to purchase or sell securities” that is fraud), and United States
v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1985) (“[F]raud [is] to fail to ‘level’ with one to
whom one owes fiduciary duties.”).
335. See supra Part III.C.
336. See, e.g., O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
337. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980). Perhaps it is time that the
Court updated Chiarella to hold explicitly, rather than implicitly, that a violation of a
duty of loyalty, in connection with a sale or purchase of a security, is always a fraud in
violation of Rule 10b-5 because all duties of loyalty carry with them duties of
disclosure. See supra notes 329–337 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Interpositioning is a somewhat complicated procedure, and when
combined with a poorly-researched—or perhaps not meticulouslyresearched—set of arguments, it is quite possible that the wrong legal
result may occur: a court might incorrectly decide that specialists are
not fiduciaries, do not owe a fiduciary duty, and therefore cannot
deceive without making an affirmative representation that is contrary
to fact, and thus a court would then find no fraud in the actions of a
specialist who interpositions.338 But specialists are fiduciaries, despite
the fact that they each serve two principals,339 and indeed they would
remain fiduciaries even if they were not paid for their troubles—
which they are.340 And because specialists are fiduciaries, their quiet
reaping of profits by interpositioning does amount to deception.341
Because interpositioning is the extraction of economic rent, rather
than something socially useful, such as true arbitrage, it is the sort of
problem that Rule 10b-5 exists to combat.342 Because specialists fit
snugly into the shoes of agents,343 while their interpositioning fits
snugly into the rubrics of breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty,344 it
appears that the courts that were given the task of judging the
specialist prosecution cases came out with the wrong results.345
Perhaps, as one commentator has suggested, courts might simply not
be well designed to sit in judgment over complex financial matters,
within complex financial regulatory systems.346 On the other hand, if
the present class action347 does not settle before it gets to the merits,
there is some hope of the courts setting the law straight and ruling
that specialists who interpose violate their fiduciary duties of loyalty
and thereby commit fraud, punishable by Rule 10b-5 and Section
10(b).
It may be that the interpositioning criminal cases are decided and
that the civil case will settle before any court has a chance to correct
its views, but what this analysis of the interpositioning prosecutions

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

See supra notes 266–269 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 285–289 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 271–273 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 75–79 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.B.
See supra Part III.C.
See supra Parts III.B, III.D.
Bove, supra note 44, at 1386.
In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 260 F.R.D. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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has shown is that the various forms of fraud in finance all share a
common theme, be it interpositioning, insider trading, or trading
ahead: using the trust that a principal (a customer or a large
commercial enterprise) might give a professional (the specialist, or
the trader), the professional receives a benefit that is really just the
exploitation of an opportunity that should have been reserved for the
principal.348 Surely, this is a cancer upon the financial system, about
which the legal system must remain ever-vigilant.

348. See supra Part III.D.

